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Introduction
The recent renewed interest in the work of Helmuth Plessner also sparked 
the use of his philosophy, theories and concepts in other f ields of science. 
Immanuel Kant, who from 1756 onwards taught geography for more than 
thirty years,1 has already coined the crucial meaning of philosophy for geog-
raphy as well as for history. Nevertheless, the disparity between philosophic 
reflection and applied human geographic research is sometimes substantial. 
Certainly, most theoretical positions within human geography are well 
founded on established philosophical positions, but as the philosopher Jeff 
Malpas reminded us of at the 2010 Meeting of the American Association 
of Geographers, there is a difference between consuming philosophical 
insights and having a dialogue among geographers and philosophers 
about these insights. On one side, this involves ref lections on different 
philosophical positions and arguments about certain philosophical issues 
for geographers. On the other hand, this also involves gaining insights in 
the more practical use of philosophical arguments in geographic research 
for philosophers. This chapter focuses on the latter and therefore does not 
deal explicitly with the exegetic subtleties of how Helmuth Plessner’s work 
can be interpreted, but rather tries to show how his general views could 
productively be used and developed further in the field of human geography. 
Human geography in general, and Dutch geography in particular, has a long 
tradition in applied research in service of sometimes also rather imperi-
alist ruling powers (Ernste 2008; Ernste 2009). However, today’s human 
geography is strongly influenced by a critical and emancipatory tradition 
(Habermas 1972). Independent of whether it is based on a critical stance or 
from a more mainstream point of view, in both cases, human geographers 
want that their research matters in practice for today’s society (Massey 
and Allen 1985). As such human geographic research is problem oriented. 
Of course, it is a well-known fact that Helmuth Plessner was also not wary 
of critical thinking and political and social philosophy (Plessner 2003a; 
1 http://www.manchester.edu/kant/Notes/notesGeography.htm
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Plessner 1999). In this contribution, I therefore would like to explore how 
the core concept of eccentric positionality coined by Helmuth Plessner, can 
be used for the analysis of current societal problems and how it contributes 
to the related social theories.
In the following I will focus on a f ield of application at the core of human 
geography, namely urban development and urban living. The urban envi-
ronment represents a specif ic spatial setting, which also calls for a specif ic 
way of life, or to put it in contemporary human geographic terminology, a 
specif ic human sociospatial practice. This is a specif ic example of the more 
general relationship between space and human being, which is the classical 
focus of human geographic research. As a starting point, I approach this 
relationship from a geographic action theoretic viewpoint (Werlen 1992; 
2009a; 2009b), although my elaborations will also lead me to some outlooks 
to post-structural theories of practice (Bourdieu 1977; 1990; De Certeau 1984; 
Schatzki 2001), which are currently enjoying great popularity in human 
geography. I criticise both theoretical approaches on the ground that, to 
a large degree, they neglect a thorough conceptualization of the human 
being in their relationship with the environment, even though critical 
human geography has the pretention to put human beings in the center. 
Certainly, human geography is not just about human beings, but also about 
space and spatiality. Strangely enough, space and spatiality is nevertheless 
given much more thought by human geographers than the human being. 
To explain what I mean, let us f irst return to urban life as an example for 
such a concrete relationship between human being and space. One way 
to approach urban living would be by means of a fashionable theoretician 
like Henri Lefebvre (Soja 1996). But in this case, I prefer not to celebrate 
fashionability but rather focus on the argument itself. To do so, I chose to 
focus on one of the classics, Georg Simmel, who actually was one of the f irst 
to address this relationship so poignantly.
Urban development
In 1903, Georg Simmel wrote his famous essay “The Metropolis and Mental 
Life.” In contrast to the later Louis Wirth (1938), Simmel did not compare 
urban life with rural life, but rather distinguished modern urban life from 
pre-modern life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the heyday 
of modernism, he described urban life as characteristic for a modernistic 
way of living. Simmel actually grew up in Berlin, at the corner of Leipziger 
and Friedrichstraße, during a time when the city was undergoing a trans-
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formation from a provincial administrative capital into a cosmopolitan, 
industrialized, modern metropolis. At that time, Berlin was the world’s 
f ifth largest city in population size (Scaff 1988; Jung 1990). Simmel’s deep-
est commitments and mental instincts were formed in a setting in which 
aesthetic culture, art, psychic nuance and emotive expressiveness linked 
to the oppositional identity of Jewish intellectuals (Käsler 1984, 357-385) 
and to the turn-of-the-century Viennese bourgeoisie milieu (Schorske 1981).
For Simmel, social life in modern cities was noncommittal and un-
engaged. Surrounded by the many others with whom one has no direct 
relationship, one can actually only do one thing, namely to (partly) ‘switch 
off’ or acquire a selective distance. This seems to be a recipe for how to 
deal with the big crowds in the city. It would not only be impossible, but 
also unnecessary, to actively engage with everyone one encounters. Such 
encounters happen, for example, when people sit next to you on the bus, 
when you stand in front of a traff ic light next to another car, or whenever 
you are in an elevator with many others, not talking to each other, not even 
looking at each other, almost as if you are alone in this world. But even 
then, this kind of behavior has to be qualif ied as social behavior, as you do 
take the presence of the others into account. This peculiar kind of solitude, 
which seems so typical for modern cities, is a kind of togetherness based 
on uncommitted detachment. Being ‘alone’ in a full train is indeed not the 
same as being alone in an empty one. It demands that one coordinates one’s 
own use of space with the movements of others, and that one communicates 
with each other by means of an implicit social language of indifference.
At another accession, Simmel assumes the special character of urban 
psyche as follows: the human being is essentially a differentiating being. 
People create meaning and make sense of their surrounding by selectively 
distinguishing different sensual impressions. We determine when and what 
we perceive, how we endorse certain tones and sounds, and what we simply 
ignore. However, this ability to f ilter our perceptions is heavily strained by 
our urban environment. In the city, we are confronted with an explosion of 
sensual impressions and rapidly changing sceneries, a continuously chaotic 
and almost random stream of impulses, which overburdens our ability to 
make useful distinguishments and selections about what deserves our 
attention. Mental life in modern cities is characterised by an overload of 
stimuli.
Following Simmel, Robert Park (1967, 40-41) writes in a similar fashion 
about the intensive stimuli of urban life, which, at least to a certain degree, 
may even be attractive for young and fresh nerves. The downside of this 
situation, especially for those with somewhat older and worn nerves, is that 
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one is torn somewhere between excitement and powerlessness. Such a bom-
bardment of our senses also carries the risk that one is literally distracted, 
and often even agitated, causing us to respond with a blaze attitude, a kind 
of chronic disengagement and indifference towards our surrounding. At 
the time of Georg Simmel in early-twentieth-century Berlin, distancing 
oneself from the urban jungle still required active and perhaps forceful 
effort. Today, with all our mobile technologies, ranging from MP3 players 
to smartphones, one does not even need to appropriate such an attitude, 
as the technical aids pick up on this logic of detachment in a perfect way. 
Immersed in our private soundscape or involved in a talk with someone 
else at the other end of the phone, one can easily detach from the city as 
shared perception space or social space.
This subjective attitude also corresponds, according to Simmel, to a more 
fundamental aspect of modern social interaction. In this modern urban 
context, an increasing number of aspects of social interaction are reduced 
to market transactions, or the logic of our monetary economy. Walter Ben-
jamin calls this the ‘theatre of buying and consuming’ (Benjamin 1986, 40). 
The dominance of monetary economy in modern cities also has specif ic 
effects on people’s personalities, as not just the urban social constitution 
but also the monetary exchange relationships imply a functional, succinct 
impersonal way of relating to other people and the material world around 
us (Simmel 1997, 176). In Simmel’s eyes, this latent antipathy and a kind 
of pre-stage of practical antagonism affect the distances and aversions, 
without which urban life would be impossible.
The rules of repulsion or non-participation are a part of the spatial 
economy of the city, according to which bodies in space are sorted and 
kept at a distance to minimize social exchange. This social logic on the 
one hand produces anonymity amongst the crowd and on the other hand 
encourages the urban actor to stand out and make a good performance in 
order to tell apart oneself from that same crowd. If nobody listens to you, 
it is diff icult to be heard, even by oneself (ibid., 184). On the street, nobody 
seems to be watching, while at the same time we are all trying to present 
our selves to the others (Goffman 1959; Davenport and Beck 2002).
The anxiety of anonymity is the driving force, which turns the city to a 
stage for the performance that mediates between the individual and the 
collective. This is the place where the tension between the recognition and 
respect of others, as an ethics of identity, is played out against the isolation 
of the self and the current social differences. Urban life is a continuous 
dilemma between individual concretizations and the possibilities for urban 
sociality. What is crucial in Simmel’s observations is that he problematizes 
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the idea of a harmonic urban culture. He characterizes modern urban life 
as under-determined, f lowing, permanently becoming and overcoming 
(Jensen 2006).
Simmel’s ideas have shown to be path breaking in urban research and 
have been picked up and developed further by many others. One of the most 
influential followers was Louis Wirth, who in 1938 wrote a seminal essay 
with the title: “Urbanism as a Way of Life.” Here, Wirth proposed a research 
agenda for examining how cities produced forms of social interaction that 
is different from those of rural settlements, hence aiming to determine how 
urban and rural ways of life could be distinguished.
Wirth attempted to analyze urban culture by distinguishing three ‘inde-
pendent variables’ – size, density and heterogeneity – which he identif ied 
as causal factors behind urban cultural life. In his own words:
Large numbers count for individual variability, the relative absence 
of intimate personal acquaintanceship, the segmentation of human 
relations, which are largely anonymous, superf icial and transitory, and 
associated characteristics. Density involves diversif ication specialisation, 
the coincidence of close physical contract and distant social relations, 
glaring contrasts, a complex pattern of segregation, the predominance of 
formal social control, and accentuated friction, among other phenomena. 
Heterogeneity tends to break down rigid social structures and to produce 
mobility, instability, and insecurity, and the aff iliation of the individuals 
with a variety of interesting and tangential social grounds with a high 
rate of membership turnover. The pecuniary nexus tends to displace 
personal relations, and institutions tend to cater to mass rather than 
individual requirements. The individual thus becomes effective only as 
he acts through organised groups (Wirth 1938, 1).
All three traits mentioned by Wirth were seen as being characteristic 
of urban rather than rural life: only cities had large numbers, and dense 
heterogeneous social relations. Wirth thus implied that there was some 
connection between the type of settlement and psychic life; that certain 
sorts of personalities, psychic traits, and attitudes towards life, were closely 
associated with being in the city.
It is clear that Wirth drew not just on the work of Simmel, but also on 
Ferdinand Tönnies’s (2002) distinction between community (Gemeinschaft) 
and society (Gesellschaft).
Although Louis Wirth’s work sparked a tremendous body of research in 
the f ield of urban geography and even nowadays still seems to have some 
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sway over policy-makers, the idea of there being a generalizable ‘urban 
way of life’ was rejected as it showed that even in some of the largest urban 
environments, collective life persists in segregated groups. Many inner 
city populations consist of relatively homogeneous groups, with social and 
cultural moorings that shield it fairly effectively from the suggested conse-
quences of number, density and heterogeneity (Gans 1968, 99). Furthermore, 
a number of counter examples were produced to the supposedly anonymous 
and anomic patterns of urban life, but also to the integrated community 
of the countryside. In summary, the evidence for the urban-rural contrast 
was found unconvincing.
However, it would be premature to completely write off Wirth’s contribu-
tion, as some – mainly American writers – have recast Wirth’s framework 
in somewhat different terms. Claude Fischer (1982), for example, argues 
that urban life allows the proliferation of subcultures and identities, since 
people can always choose a variety of bases on which to identify themselves. 
Urbanism allows such subcultures to proliferate, since a critical mass for the 
formation of a distinct culture is often only possible in a city of a certain size.
In general, Wirth’s work went through a period of reappraisal in which it 
was recognized that the original critiques were, albeit justif ied, vastly over-
stated. Indeed, the issue of conflict, dispute and negotiation was often too 
neglected in this search for counterexamples. Furthermore, ethnographic 
studies continue to demonstrate that local contexts and spatial arrange-
ments do matter. Finally, it was shown that these contradictory conditions 
and phenomena, such as community and society, usually co-exist with one 
another. So it might not be invalid but just more complicated.
And as we shall see below, the work of Simmel seems to point the way to 
go, by stressing the double sidedness of modern urban life; a double sidede-
ness, which Plessner analogously describes as both, the centric and eccentric 
positionality of human being. Simmel’s description of the double sidedness 
of urban life was also picked up by later authors such as Urry (1990), Jay 
(1996), Berman (1984), Gregory (1994), Harvey (2009), Frisby (1992) and many 
others. Marshall Berman, for example, writes about the double sidedness 
of modern urban life (1984, 123). The freedom of human beings to develop 
and change themselves cannot be separated from the insecurity deriving 
from the uncertainty of urban possibilities. Here, Berman conceives the 
street as a microcosm of modern life and the struggle for public space as 
the core of modernist striving. Encounters on a street in a big city are very 
unpredictable. As we walk down a busy street, we never know who we 
are going to meet, or what will follow as a result. On the one hand, this 
represents an enormous potential – for example, to meet the love of our 
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lives, or to meet a potential employer or an old friend – but on the other 
hand it is very distressing – we could be robbed, attacked, or even killed.
These ethnographic descriptions do not just show an urban setting that 
has certain affects on human behavior and on human mental life. They 
are also more than just a description of the typical materiality of urban 
forms and urban society, as they are not only facts about urban life, but are 
mutually constitutive in a complex way, from which we do not just gain a 
better understanding of the urban but also of the human life, as well as 
their intricate relationship.
What is central here is the relationship between urban environment 
and social relations or society, which the human being is a part of. Thus, 
the physical form of the city is a crucial element. In traditional sociol-
ogy, as well as in traditional human geography, the material objects in 
the urban environment are conceived as objects on which we project a 
certain meaning and which we use for the expression of socially determined 
meanings. Space as such is symbol for society. However, this view assumes 
a fundamentally binary world order, in which society is, in the end, kept 
separate from the physical environment. Life in the city is conceived from 
a sociocentric point of view, irrespective of whether we, in doing so, refer to 
‘rational choices’ (Becker 1978), ‘sense making actions’ (Werlen 1992), ‘pure 
communication’ (Luhmann 1996), ‘binding institutionalisations’ (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991; Hall and Tayler 1996) or determining societal discourses 
(Foucault 1970). In all cases, the non-social disappears behind the social, 
even though, as Heike Delitz (2009) expressed it, we are surrounded by these 
physical artefacts. These artefacts are still seen as passive objects, serving 
only as the symbolic representation of the social, which was constituted 
beforehand and to a large part independently of the physical urban forms.
An alternative possibility, Delitz (2009) continued, lies in allowing urban 
space to play a much more active role, i.e. treating space as an active medium 
of the social. A number of scholars already made propositions in this direc-
tion. For example, Benjamin (1999) conceived urban structures, especially 
shopping arcades, as expressions of the modern consumption society, while 
at the same time, such shopping arcades also played an important role in 
the construction of the consuming subjects. Also, Michel Foucault (1984) 
emphasized the role of spatial configurations in the genesis of power rela-
tions. An example worth mentioning here would be the Panopticon. These 
early proposals do allow a two-sided relationship between urban space on 
the one hand, and human being and society on the other. Nevertheless, none 
of these scholars were able to fully overcome the classic Cartesian duality. 
For this task, we are in need of other conceptualizations.
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One possibility can be traced back to the French sociology of life, of which 
Gilles Deleuze is an important representative, as he conceived urban life as 
an immanent process, as a ‘becoming of difference.’ This urban sociology, 
inspired by philosophy of life, does not only conceive social being as just 
consisting of intentional acting subjects, but rather also includes all ‘bodies’ 
in an active constellation, which can only be described in combination, as 
a whole, as a Gestalt (King and Wertheimer 2005; Marks 1998). A similar 
approach is conducted by Bruno Latour (2005), though he uses different 
terminology. Given the limiting scope of this chapter, I cannot go into more 
details with respect to these approaches.
Instead, as Delitz (2009) suggested, another non-Cartesian alternative, 
derived from philosophical anthropology, is of interest here. This school of 
thought is also founded on philosophy of life and enables to think of human 
corporeality and urban artefacts together with the social. In contrast to the 
French vitalism, the philosophical anthropological approach inspired by 
German idealism, emphasizes the special position of human beings and 
their ability and necessity for stabilizing human life. This implies that one 
does not rush to conclude the constructive character of human nature, but 
takes into account the special character of human biology. Following the 
work of Henri Bergson (1911; see also Deleuze 1991) and Hans Driesch (1909), 
life is conceptualized as a process of creative differentiations and as the 
formation of an own individuality. In addition, the theory of environment 
of Jakob von Uexküll (1909; see also Von Uexküll 2001) contributed substan-
tially to this school of thought. In his theory, each living organism is bound 
to its own niche, which f its to its inner world. Philosophical anthropology 
goes one step further, as it assumes that the human being is, after all, not 
just like any other animal, but rather is a uniquely unspecialized animal that 
is characterized by a profound world-openness. These insights turn out to 
be more than mere philosophical speculation, as the special position of the 
human being is increasingly also biologically (specif ically evolutionarily) 
founded (Portmann 1970).
It was especially the biologist and philosopher Helmuth Plessner who 
has systematically developed and elaborated this position. His main work 
was published in the same year as Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and 
indeed shows a number of parallels. However, while Heidegger takes time 
as a starting point, Plessner places the metaphor of space as his point of 
departure (Schatzki 2007; De Mul 2003). In this sense, Plessner argues that 
all living organisms constitute themselves by bordering themselves off 
from their environment. ‘Living things’ are ‘border realizing things.’ They 
therefore have a ‘position’ in space. However, not all living creatures are 
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the same. While non-human animals are bound to their niche, they do not 
just react automatically on impulses from the environment, but have the 
virtuous of choice, spontaneity, consciousness and intelligence. Yet, their 
choices are subject to the primacy of the practical, which coordinates their 
reactions (Eßbach 1994, 23f.). Human beings are different (though from 
an empirical point of view, the development from non-human animals 
to Homo sapiens sapiens may be gradual). The stimulus-response cycle, 
which still dominates animal behavior, is interrupted for human beings. 
The relationship between the inner world and the environment is not direct 
or f ixed. Humans are not restricted to react to their environment from the 
central position only. This hiatus is the basis of human reflexivity. Human 
beings are at distance from their own living-centred bodily being (Leib) 
and thus have their own corporeal body (Körper) at their disposal and 
are, as Helmuth Plessner calls it, ‘eccentrically positioned.’ Like all living 
creatures, human beings also have to maintain their bodily boundaries. 
The main difference is that the human beings are aware of this, and 
therefore experience it as a task. Human beings are, as such, unadapted 
and unspecialized, not just with respect to their outer world but also with 
respect to their own inner world. The complexity of the unspecified stimuli, 
which patter down on us from the outside as well as the complexity of the 
excessive unspecif ied drives needs to be reduced. Here we can observe 
a characteristic similarity between Plessner’s conceptualization and the 
autopoietic systems postulated by Varela and Maturana (1980). The human 
being, thus, needs artefacts, routines and institutions, to actively manage 
this border relationship. Through these artif ices, affections, motives, ac-
tions, perceptions, imaginations and social relations are channelled and 
habitualized. As a consequence, human beings are artif icial by nature. 
At the same time, the human being is not separated from this artif icial 
environment, but rather forms a unity with it. The whole human existence is 
therefore an embodiment. Institutions, but also the built environment and 
even the natural environment become an embodiment and objectivation of 
his actions. Since this embodiment is artif icial, it is contingent and can be 
changed. From this profuse vitality, as Delitz (2009) described it, all cultural 
processes are fed, history is made, and geographic differentiations emerge; 
or to use Benno Werlen’s words, “everyday geography [is] made” (Werlen 
2009b). So what the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner does 
not do, is defining the substantial essence of human being. To the contrary, 
instead of trying to essentialize the human existence, Plessner understands 
it as a permanently becoming. Plessner describes the human being as the 
Homo absconditus, the inscrutable being, inscrutable for others but also 
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for one self. The human being is to itself as well as to others, dependent on 
an expression, a mask, a role, a performance to become what it is. All the 
while, this mask or outer skin, also hides and distances the self from the 
outer world, and as such creates space for change.
The human eccentric positionality is the position of the self-conscious-
ness. It is a place that cannot be located on any map. It is the point of view 
from a utopian position, from which the human being still experiences 
itself in its concrete here and now in the directness of its relation to the 
objects in the environment and to itself. But at the same time, the human 
being feels distanced from its own direct experiences from this eccentric 
position; a position beyond space and time from which the human being 
becomes aware of the contingency and relativity of concrete life (Plessner 
2003b, 363). From this position, the human being also becomes consciously 
aware of individuality and the non-differentiated sociality (ibid., 375). In 
this non-differentiated sociality, the human being experiences himself 
as possibly equal to others, as part of a shared ‘we’-world. It is the sphere 
between things and human beings and – last, but not least – also between 
places (Entrikin 1991). It is a utopian place, and seen from this place each 
concretization in life with all its restrictions in time and space cannot 
succeed. The eccentrically positioned human being, therefore, cannot 
avoid having to start over again, to continue to act, to create anew and to 
reinvent himself. Helmuth Plessner summarizes these insights into three 
anthropological laws:
1. The Law of natural artificiality, which suggests that each human being 
must create his or her own life to compensate for the natural place he or 
she has lost through the process of hominization (Nennen 1991, 20ff.).
2. The Law of mediated immediacy, according to which the relation between 
eccentric human beings and their environment is actively mediated by 
human corporeality and its artificial relatedness to the social and physical 
environment, enabling humans to objectify (and subjectify) themselves 
and their environment. Human being and identity is therefore partly 
created and limited by these physical, technical and cultural media.2 On 
the other hand, the eccentric positionality allows the human being to 
aware of that which enables him to create a distance between himself 
and the environment and to transcend the limitations of a particular 
2 In the context of urban life forms, the issue of the resistance or inherent logic of cities and 
their repercussions on the urban way of life is currently coined by Martina Löw, see e.g. http://
www.stadtforschung.tudarmstadt.de/media/loewe_eigenlogik_der_staedte/dokumente_down-
load/artikel/martinaloew_intrinsiclogicofcities.pdf.
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mediatedness. Be that as it may, humans still cannot entirely avoid being 
somehow mediated (Hammer 1967, 170).
3. The Law of utopian position points to our eccentric positionality. From 
that position, we are at a distance with our own physical existence and 
our passive experience in a world of praxis. Because of this eccentric 
positionality, every human being experiences his or her ‘constitutive 
homelesness,’ which impels him or her to transcend the achieved and 
thus perpetually search for the unreachable ‘home’: a position of unam-
biguous f ixation, a place in this world, and a clear identity for the self 
and the world around it. The eccentric positionality leads to a positioning 
in a counterfactual utopian home, a kind of ‘smooth place’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 383) or ‘non-place’ (Augé 1995, 75f.), or perhaps also 
counterfactual ideal speech situation (Habermas 1984) can be seen as 
related to this utopian position with real concrete effects. In this utopian 
position, we feel related to the ‘other’ excluded from our own factual 
concrete being, doing, and saying. This detached positionality, which is 
constitutive of human subjectivity, is also the power of putting oneself 
in the place of any other person, indeed, of any other living thing. Where 
there is one person, Plessner says, there is every person. Thus, a particular 
being, in one’s own limited, parochial situation, can be seen as a non-
utopian concretion of this utopian generality, thereby providing a general 
basis for the sociality of human actions. But there are different sides to 
the transcendence of the particular through the postulation of, or even 
religious believe in, a concrete utopia. On the one hand, it is the human 
eccentric positionality, which makes this need for transcendence to a 
human a priori. But on the other hand, that same positionality towards 
this transcendence is unveiled as an unreachable utopia (Hammer 1967, 
185ff.).
In one of my previous essays, I have already tried to show that these laws, 
which, because of their paradoxality, already sound very postmodern, 
indeed could mediate between classical late-modern action theories and 
post-structural approaches (Ernste 2004). Putting that aside, let us now 
return to the issue of understanding urban life.
Some patterns, as they were described earlier by Simmel and Berman, 
now gain a clear anthropological meaning. Urban life seems to be exemplary 
for the double aspectivity of human life as proclaimed by Helmuth Plessner. 
The law of natural artif iciality expresses itself both in the performativity 
(Butler 1997; Jacobs 1998; Rose 1999) and in the hiding mask or blazé-ness of 
urban life. The law of utopian position shows that the idea that the human 
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being can live in perfect harmony and stability within its own niche, as 
Wirth’s idealized description of the living on the countryside (in contrast 
to urban life) presupposes, is unfeasible or even impossible. The inherent 
discomfort with the actual embodiment and objectif ication of human 
life urges us to continue acting, to become creative and to search for new 
possibilities. The special attractiveness of cities seems partly explainable 
on the basis of these anthropological insights, as the vast potentialities and 
contingencies of cities, at least in some respects, seem to come closer to what 
has been described as eccentric positionality. It almost seems as if modern 
urban life provides a partial realization of what we would otherwise only 
experience from our eccentric positionality. Does urban living indeed strive 
towards an eccentric existence? What Georg Simmel described as process 
of modernisation might then in philosophical anthropological terms be 
understood as a process in which we try to get closer to an eccentric urban 
world. An eccentric urban world in which the city is formed in such a way 
that it offers a maximum of different possibilities, different forms of com-
munity with many different groups and in which the city is experienced as 
a playground for creativity, for masking and de-masking in multiple ways, 
and for socialisation and privatisation, for performativity and for selectivity. 
While we set boundaries in the city, we also transgress these boundaries 
and move on. In this sense, these anthropological insights in urban life are 
also an important input for the currently popular theories on cultures of 
mobility (Sheller and Urry 2006), where urban life can be conceptualized as 
being permanently on the move, as a continuous becoming and overcoming. 
Seen from this point of view, creating a city environment is an enormous 
challenge for the concretization and design of urban life.
But before we hurry to go and create ‘the eccentric city,’ a word of caution 
should also be given. One has to be careful when trying to determine how 
the utopian position or a particular utopian city should look like, as such 
kind of objectif ications are bound to be unsuccessful. The oppositions in 
the three anthropological laws declare that we cannot be either/or and that 
we always have to be both at once: natural and artif icial; immediate and 
mediated; utopian and concrete.
Conclusion
What we learn from these elaborations is that a philosophical anthropologi-
cal approach to urban geography can indeed bring forward both a critical 
scrutinization of hitherto conceptualizations, as well as a number of hints 
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for future urban design. While the work of Simmel shows a number of 
relationships to the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner, 
the conceptualization of the urban by Louis Wirth does not reflect this 
anthropological sensitivity. This becomes understandable once we take a 
look at the broader setting in which Georg Simmel and Louis Wirth oper-
ated. As Rudolph Weingartner (1960), and subsequently Deena and Michael 
Weinstein (1993) show, Georg Simmel felt a close relationship with the new 
philosophy of life, which he tried to synthesize with the neo-Kantian legacy 
(Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey). At an early stage, he already dealt with the 
founding fathers of the philosophy of life, including Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, as well as with the work of Henri Bergson, whose Creative Evolu-
tion [L’Évolution créatrice, 1907] at Simmel’s instigation was translated into 
German by his student and mistress Gertrud Kantorowicz (Jung 1990, 13). 
Simmel is fascinated by the interplay between Life and Form. While Life, in 
the view of Simmel, should be understood as a continuous stream, forms are 
the points of rest and fixation as objectifications of the process of life, which, 
as such, also develop their own inherent dynamics. So mankind expresses 
itself in objectif ications, which Hegel designated as ‘objective spirit.’ These 
objectif ications reach from societal and state institutions, all the way to 
moral rules, habits, law, religion, art, and science, and not to forget, to 
architecture and urban design. While human beings need these objectif ica-
tions to survive, they are at the same time bound, restricted and reduced 
by them. Life needs forms, but simultaneously also needs more than just 
these forms, which once established, always hamper the pulsating stream 
of life (Jung 1990). The tragedy of life is that it is compelled to constantly 
objectify itself in forms. Unable to ever f ind comfort in these same forms, 
life is urged to transcend them in a perpetual cycle. Life appears both as 
unbounded continuity, as well as a bounded ‘I.’ Life always strives for more 
life (Simmel 1918, 12). Simmel describes this as a double boundary, implying 
that our existence can only be described in such paradoxical terms as ‘we 
are bounded in every direction, and we are bounded in no direction,’ and 
‘man is the limited being that has no limit’ (Weinstein and Weinstein 1993, 
105). In other words, human beings are defined as boundaries of boundaries, 
never able to be just one thing, and always remaining elusive (ibid. 219). 
In this way, the individual urban dweller is ever-resistant to absorption 
into the urban social totality. The metropolis is the site of critical tension 
inherent in the atrophy of individual culture through the hypertrophy of 
objective culture (109). This ambivalence of urban life shows great resem-
blance with postmodern thought. As such, Simmel can be characterized as 
a postmodernist avant la lettre at the height of modernism.
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Louis Wirth, on the other hand, took Simmel’s description more on its 
impressionist face value and applied it in a modernist way, which we can 
also describe as a behaviourist approach, describing urban forms – size, 
density and heterogeneity – as causal factors or independent variables, 
determining human behavior and human attitudes. This also suggests 
that one can inf luence human behavior by providing a certain spatial 
setting in such a way that the urban dweller can feel at home and in a way 
that lets urban communities f lourish. Thus, Louis Wirth was a child of the 
modernist tradition of his time. Even if one does not follow his generalized 
conclusions nowadays and accepts that urban realities are more complex, 
the behavioral and modernist implications of his observations can still 
hold some merit. What is missing in Wirth’s conceptualization of urban 
life, and in the work of many urban geographers in the same tradition, 
are the philosophical anthropological insights Georg Simmel anticipated. 
Not only are they extensively elaborated in the work of Helmuth Plessner, 
but they gained renewed relevance in the face of today’s late-modernist 
(Werlen 2009b) and post-structuralist (Baudrillard, Lyotard, Derrida, see 
also Weinstein and Weinstein 1993) social constructivism (Ernste 2004).
From this philosophical anthropologically informed point of view, we can 
at least enjoy an improved understanding of the dialectics of urban life, as 
Simmel described it. At the same time, we can better imagine urban designs, 
which anticipate the eccentric positionality and double boundary of the 
urban dwelling, as well as the eccentric and becoming qualities of the city.
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